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I. INTRODUCTION 
Before Appellant Billie Jo Major ("Major") filed this lawsuit against Respondent 
Security Equipment Corporation ("SEC"), SEC had no knowledge that exposure to its Oleoresin 
Capsicum ("OC") pepper spray products could cause chronic, permanent, irreversible injury of 
the type alleged by Major. Prior to March of2008, when SEC's pepper spray products were last 
sold to Major's employer, the Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), there was nothing 
published in the peer-reviewed literature that causally associated exposure to pepper spray with 
chronic adverse health conditions. In fact, to date, nothing has been published that makes that 
causal association. 
Pepper spray, also known as OC spray, is derived from natural pepper plants. It is 
designed and intended to cause acute and temporary adverse health effects in humans, including 
acute inflammation of the eyes, skin and respiratory tract and acute mucus production, sneezing 
and coughing. Those acute adverse health effects are known in the industry and in the published 
literature to be temporary, transient, reversible and recoverable. For these reasons, pepper spray 
has been used by law enforcement and correctional agencies all over the world for decades as a 
safe and effective means of temporarily demobilizing, incapacitating and gaining control of 
offenders, inmates and assailants, without the need to use more physical or lethal forms of force. 
In this case, Major's expert toxicologist, Dr. Garold Yost ("Dr. Yost") has given an 
opinion that Major's exposure to SEC's pepper spray products in March 2008 caused her to 
suffer a chronic, irreversible health condition manifested by chronic coughing, but causation is 
not an issue on this appeal. Rather, the primary issue in dispute is whether SEC owed Major a 
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legal duty to warn that exposure to its pepper spray products could foreseeably cause the chronic, 
irreversible health condition of which Major complains. 
Major offered three affidavits of Dr. Yost on the foreseeability issue, the last two being 
filed in support of Major's repeated motions for reconsideration after the trial court had already 
granted SEC summary judgment. In the first affidavit, Dr. Yost opined only that it was known 
prior to March 2008 that exposure to pepper spray posed a risk of acute respiratory injury. In the 
latter two affidavits, Dr. Yost opined, for the first time and without the support of any known 
literature or scientific studies, that it was known prior to 2008 that exposure to pepper spray 
posed a risk of chronic respiratory injury such as that alleged by Major. 
Dr. Yost had never previously published his opinion on the foreseeable risk of chronic 
injury, and he could not cite from any published studies or literature where any other scientist 
had concluded that exposure to OC pepper spray could cause chronic disease. To the contrary, 
Dr. Yost previously testified in his deposition that there were no publications on the association 
between OC pepper spray exposure and chronic disease, that the published literature has 
generally concluded that the adverse health effects from OC exposure are temporary and 
transitory, and that there was nothing in the peer-reviewed literature published prior to March of 
2008 that would have put SEC on notice that exposure to its pepper spray could cause the 
chronic, irreversible health condition of which Major complains. 
Based on this record, the trial court correctly held that the affidavits of Dr. Yost were not 
sufficient to create material disputes of fact, and that SEC was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law, on grounds that: (1) there being no evidence that SEC knew, or should have 
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known, prior to March 2008, of a foreseeable risk of chronic injury from exposure to its pepper 
spray products, SEC had no legal duty to warn Major of such risk; and (2) since it was obvious 
and well known to Major and in the published literature that exposure to pepper spray causes 
acute, transient and recoverable adverse health effects, SEC had no legal duty to warn of the 
obvious risk of such acute injury. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course ofProceedings/Standards of Review. 
On July 14,2011, after hearing oral argument on the parties' cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment, the trial court denied Major's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted SEC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that in focusing on acute, rather than chronic injury. Dr. 
Yost's First Affidavit was insufficient to create a material dispute of fact on the issue of whether, 
prior to March 2008, the chronic injuries of which Major complains were known or foreseeable 
risks of exposure to SEC's pepper spray products, and therefore that SEC had no duty to warn of 
the risk of chronic injuries as a matter of law. (TR (7114111) 38:8-20, 42:12-44:9, 46:2-10, 
49:13-20,50:2-16 and 79-86; R 001004-1005.)1 
On July 26, 2011, Major filed a Motion to Reconsider the trial court's July 19, 2011 
I In granting SEC's First Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court reserved the issue of whether or 
not Major had a viable claim arising out of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act ("FHSA"). (ROO I 005; 
TR (07114/11) 89:13-90, 91; 21-23.) On July 22, 2011, SEC filed its Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment on that limited issue. (ROO 1 007-1009.) The trial court granted the motion, holding that there 
was no private cause of action under the FHSA, that the FHSA could not be the basis of a negligence per 
se claim, and that for the same reasons Major's common law claims failed, Major failed to create a 
material fact dispute as to whether chronic injury was a known or foreseeable risk of exposure to pepper 
spray. (Tr (09/15/11) 154: 10-163; ROOI739-00 1741.) Since that issue is already addressed in the body of 
this brief, SEC need not address it again in the context of the FHSA. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3 14542-011 (474303) 
Order Granting SEC's First Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of this Motion to 
Reconsider, Major filed a Second Affidavit of Dr. Garold Yost. (R 001049-2050, 001064-1252.) 
On August 18,2011, SEC moved to strike the Second Affidavit of Dr. Yost. (R 001300-1302.) 
After hearing argument on these motions on September 15, 2011, the trial court granted SEC's 
Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Dr. Yost, holding that, since the affidavit failed to 
explain its direct contradictions with Dr. Yost's prior deposition testimony, it constituted a sham 
affidavit which could not be relied upon to create a material question of fact. (Tr (09/15111) 102-
104, 112:20-114:10, 118:16-120:7, 126:18-127:25, 129:20-130:9, 133-136, 138, 147:14-155:1; R 
001739-1741.) For the same reason, the court denied Major's Motion for Reconsideration. (Jd.) 
On September 20, 2011, SEC filed a Motion for Clarification, which the trial court 
treated as a motion for summary judgment, on Major's claim of acute injury. (R 001599-1601, 
001739-1741; Tr (09/22111) 165:5-17, 178-179.) On October 4,2011, Major filed a Second 
Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's Order Granting SEC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the chronic injury issue, on grounds that, if Major should prevail on her claim that 
SEC was liable for her acute injury, she would then be entitled to recover damages for "the 
chronic injury even if it was unforeseeable at the time." (R 001685-1686.) On 
October 17,2011, after hearing oral argument on these motions, the trial court granted SEC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the acute injury issue, holding as a matter of law that SEC 
had no legal duty to warn of the risks of the acute effects of OC spray because they were known 
and obvious. (Tr (10117111) 195:20-198; R 001739-1741.) For the same reasons, and also 
finding that Major could not manipulate, or "back door," her claim of acute injury into damages 
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for a chronic injury, the trial court also denied Major's Second Motion for Reconsideration. (Id.; 
Tr (10/17/11) 181:11-184:17.) 
On October 24,2011, four (4) days after the trial court entered Final Judgment in favor of 
SEC, Major filed a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's orders granting SEC's 
Motions for Summary Judgment and striking the Second Affidavit of Dr. Yost. (R 001743, 
001739-1742,001745-1746.) Major filed a Third Affidavit of Dr. Yost in support of this Motion 
for Reconsideration. (R 001747-2037.) After hearing argument on the Motion, on January 26, 
2012, the trial court denied Major's Third Motion for Reconsideration on grounds that: 1) Dr. 
Yost's Third Affidavit still did not offer evidence that SEC knew or should have known that its 
OC spray "had the potential of causing long-term chronic effects." 2) it was still not sufficient to 
create a dispute of material fact on the issue of foreseeability of chronic injury and, 3) it still did 
not adequately explain the conflicts between Dr. Yost's affidavits and his earlier deposition 
testimony. (Tr (01126/12) 13:22-14:7, 16: 15-17: 19,23:23-29:3; R 002236-2239.) 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. OC/Pepper Spray 
a. OC is the natural, concentrated solvent extract of hot peppers that contains 
active compounds referred to as capsaicinoids, which produce irritation and pain. (Conf. Ex. 3, 
p. 000004, ~ 5.) OC spray is a self-defense weapon used by law enforcement and military 
personnel worldwide for temporarily incapacitating non-compliant subjects by non-physical and 
non-lethal methods. (Id.; Conf. Ex. 4, p. 000005, ~ 10.) 
b. Pepper sprays are specifically designed and intended to cause acute 
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adverse health effects in humans. (Conf. Ex. 4, p. 000002, ~ 2.) Their purpose is to demobilize 
subjects for a temporary period of time, allowing the individual using the product to safely 
escape or, in the case of law enforcement, to gain control of an offender. (Id.) 
c. The effects of OC spray exposure in humans are known in the published 
literature to be acute, transient, reversible and recoverable within a short period of time. (Conf. 
Ex. 3, p. 000004, ~ 7; Conf. Ex. 4, pp. 000002 & 000007, ~~ 2 & 17.) 
d. The effects of exposure to OC spray include acute mucus production, 
redness of the eyes, watery eyes or crying, involuntary closing of the eyes, burning sensation of 
the skin (similar to a sunburn), inflammation of the skin, sneezing and coughing, and slightly 
restricted airways. (R 000662,36:13-37:25; R 000691,35:3-37:6; R 000703,51:13-56:4; R 
000716,25:17-26:6.) 
2. SEC 
SEC is a manufacturer and seller of law enforcement and self-defense products, including 
OC sprays. SEC sells its products to law enforcement agencies as well as civilians. (Conf. Ex. 
4, p. 000002, ~ 2.) 
3. Major's Injuries 
Major claims that she suffered injuries following exposure to SEC's OC spray products 
during a training session she attended as an employee of the IDOC on March 3, 2008. (R 
000010, ~ 8.) She specifically claims that she suffers from a long-term or chronic respiratory 
illness, including RADS, chronic cough syndrome, vocal cord dysfunction, esophageal 
dysmotility and/or gastrointestinal reflux, and/or a long-term chronic aggravation or exacerbation 
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of an existing health condition, characterized by chronic excessive coughing, as a result of her 
exposure to SEC's OC spray. (R 000010, ~~ 11, 14, 19; Conf. Ex. 1, p. 000087, Supplemental 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 14.) 
4. Plaintiff's Employment at IDOC 
a. Major was employed as a correctional officer with IDOC from July 2004 
through May 2008. (R 0000644,35:2-16.) 
b. While employed at IDOC, Major was required to attend different training 
courses taught by other IDOC personnel, which included annual training regarding the use of OC 
spray. (R 000644, 92:10-93:17; R 000662,90:5-92:13; R 000687.) 
5. Major's Exposure to and Knowledge of Pepper Spray 
a. IDOC purchased law enforcement OC spray products from SEC during 
the time frame of December 2006 to January 2008, while Major was employed at IDOC. (Conf. 
Ex. 4, p. 000003, ~ 4.) 
b. Major attended IDOC OC training sessions wherein she received minor, 
acute exposures to OC spray on only five (5) occasions in almost five (5) years: 
August 20,2004, February 14,2006, February 21,2007, July 13-18,2007, and March 3, 2008. 
(R 000687; R 000678; R 000733; R 000662, 18:24-19:15, 119:25-121 :18; R 000691, 43:17-
44:25,63:12-66:12,67:2-68:12,70:13-72:23; R 000716,21:24-22:14,23:9-24:13,27:16-29:15, 
40:22-41:11,45:17-50:8; R 000703,41:17-45:17,78:5-82:16; R 000644,92:10-101:25,107:15-
108:9, 110:19-112:18, 112:19-119:14, 119:15-25, 123:12-134:10.) Major was exposed to SEC's 
OC spray products at only three (3) of these five trainings: February 14,2006, July 13-18,2007 
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and March 3, 2008. (Id.; R 000662, 119:25-121:18, 134:14-138:5; R 000678; R 000691, 43:17-
44:25,63:12-66:12,67:2-68:12, 70:13-72:23; R 000716,21:24-22:14,23:9-24:13,27:16-29:15, 
40:22-41:11,45:17-50:8; R 000703, 41:17-45:17, 78:5-82:16.) 
c. Major received her first exposure to OC during the August 20, 2004 OC 
training, when she entered a six-foot by eight-foot (6'x 8') room which had been previously 
sprayed by her trainer with a white canister of MK-9 OC fog. (R 000644, 93:18-94:4, 97:6-23, 
98:25-101:12.) She stayed in the room for about 20 seconds until she started to cough and then 
walked outside. (Id.) She stopped coughing after the training session ended. (Id.) 
d. Major's next OC training, which was the first to involve exposure to 
SEC's OC spray, took place on February 14,2006. Her instructor was Sgt. Bret Kimmel. (R 
000662,134:14-138:5.) Major, herself, does not recall the details of that training. (R 000644, 
107:5-108:9.) 
e. Major received OC training from Sgt. Dan Schaffer on February 21,2007. 
(R 000691, 63:12-66:12; R 000644, 110:19-112:18.) Major recalls the training. It was 
classroom training. She did not get exposed to OC in that training. (Id.) 
f. Major received OC training from Sgt. Dan Schaffer on July 13 and/or 18, 
2007. (R 000644,112:19-119:14; R 000691,67:2-68:12,70:13-72:23.) Major received a 15-
second exposure to OC during this training, where she was required to pick up and move an 
object that had been sprayed with OC spray. (R 000644, 112:19-119:14.) Major started 
coughing when the OC was sprayed on the object, but her cough was temporary. (Id.) 
Following her exposure, she watched and laughed as other correctional officer trainees came out 
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ofthe building coughing after they received their exposure to OC spray. (Id.) 
g. Major last had OC training with Sgts. Nick Doan and Joshua Overgaard 
on March 3, 2008. (R 000644, 119:15-25, 123:12-134:10; R 000716,23:9-24:13,27:16-29:15, 
40:22-41:11,45:17-50:8; R 000703, 41:17-45:17, 78:5-82:16.) In this training Major entered a 
room which had previously been sprayed with an MC-9 OC fog. (Id.) 
h. In June 2007, before providing Major with OC training, Sgts. Schaffer, 
Doan, and Overgaard received OC instructor training from a representative of SEC, and were 
certified by SEC as OC instructors. (R 000691, 15:14-24:19; R 000716, 15:5-19:24; R 000703, 
20:23-24:2.) They were instructed by SEC using the Sabre Instructor Certification manual 
("SEC Manual"). (R 000703, 24:8-25:3; R 000691, 75:16-76:7; R 000733.) Page 7 of the SEC 
Manual (Bates No. SEC000338) provided in part: 
oc - oleoresin capsicum - red pepper .... OC produces rapid physiological 
effects, complete recovery, and restricts immunity build-up because it is an 
inflammatory agent. 
Physiological effects 
• Eyes tear and blink repeatedly 
• Eyes close 
• Respiration of OC causes inflammation of the respiratory tract 
• Inflammation causes coughing, gagging and loss of breath sensation 
• Facial areas may also become inflamed and will bum 
• Swelling may occur around the eyes, mouth and nose 
• The nose will run and produce excessive mucus 
Effects may differ with each case. Common symptoms include light-headedness, 
uncontrollable shaking of the body, weakening legs, tightness of the chest and 
hearing impairment. The effects are all temporary. 
(R 000733, Bates No. SEC000338.) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9 14542-011 (474303) 
1. In providing annual OC training, the IDOC instructors, including Sgts. 
Kimmel, Schaffer, Overgaard and Doan, used a PowerPoint presentation that was prepared and 
provided to them by SEC. (R 000662, 132:7-134:2, 161:13-163:3; R 000691,74:21-75:6,77:2-
78:20; R 000716, 52:10-54:22; R 000703, 25:4-29:17, 66:8-68:5; R 000785.) The SEC 
PowerPoint was shown to Major and other correctional officers during their annual OC training. 
(Jd.) The PowerPoint provides in part: 
PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
• Eyes tear up and close involuntarily 
• OC causes inflammation of the respiratory tract 
• Inflammation causes coughing, gagging and loss of breath sensation 
• The skin exposed to OC may also become inflamed and will bum 
• Swelling may occur around the eyes, nose and mouth 
• The nose will run and produce excessive mucus 
(R 000785, Bates No. I.D.C. Records 000053.) 
J. As part of their annual OC training, IDOC correctional officers, including 
Major, were administered written tests. (R 000662,19:17-21:1,21:3-22:17; R 000703,114:1-
115:3; R 000821; R 000826; R 000830.) 
k. Major's test results for the August 20,2004 training are reflected in the 
Record on appeal at R 000821. (See R 000662,19:17-21:1; R. 000821.) Question 14 of that 
test, and Major's correct answer, state: 
14. What are the 3 distinct physical effects when contaminated with OC? 
A. Facial burning, eye closure, respiratory. 
(R 000821.) 
1. Major's test results for the February 14,2006 OC training are reflected in 
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the Record on appeal at R 000826. (See R 000662, 19:17-21:1, 21:3-22:17; R 000826.) 
Question 12 of that test, and Major's correct answer, state: 
12. What are the physiological effects ofOC? 
A. Redness of the eyes, runny nose, shortness of breath. 
(R 000826.) 
m. Major's test results for the March 3, 2008 OC training are reflected in the 
Record on appeal at R 000830. (See R 000662, 21:1-22:17; R 000703, 114:1-115:3; R 000830.) 
Test question number 9, and Major's correct answer, state: 
9. The physiological effects of being sprayed with OC spray are: 
A. Running nose with mucus discharge 
B. Eyes tear and involuntarily close 
C. Respiration of OC causes inflammation of the respiratory tract 
D. ALL OF THE ABOVE 
(The bold ofD indicates Major's correct answer. R 000830.) 
n. During the time Major was employed by IDOC, IDOC kept and 
maintained as part of its business records Material Safety Data Sheets ("MSDS") for SEC 
SABRE Red and other OC spray products purchased and used by IDOC in order to identify 
health hazards. (R 000662,101:15-104:18; R 000834.) A true and accurate copy of the SEC 
SABRE Red MSDS is contained in the Record at R 000834. That MSDS provides in part: 
SECTION 6-HEALTHHAZARDS 
Signs and Symptoms of Exposure: Ingredients cause irritation through all routes 
of entry. Repeated contact may cause dermatitis. Ingestion may cause nausea, 
vomiting andlor diarrhea. 
Medical Conditions Aggravated by Exposure: May cause more severe, temporary 
effects on those persons who are asthmatics or suffer from emphysema. 
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(Id.) 
o. Prior to her March 3, 2008 OC spray training, Major was aware of the 
acute effects of OC spray exposure, having previously experienced them at least four (4) times in 
annual OC training between 2004 and 2007. (R 000644,92: 1 0-101 :25, 112:19-119: 14.) 
6. SEC/Industry Knowledge of Hazards 
a. The effects of OC spray exposure to individuals were known in the law 
enforcement industry and in the published literature to be acute, transient, reversible and 
temporary. (R 000662, 36:13-37:25; R 000691, 35:3-37:6; R 000703, 51:13-56:4; R 000716, 
25:17-26:6, Conf Ex. 3, p. 000001, ~ 12.) Complete recovery from respiratory symptoms 
generally occurs within no longer than 30-60 minutes. (Id.) 
b. SEC actively keeps itself apprised of any articles, reports, statistics, 
research and other similar peer-reviewed an non-peer-reviewed materials relating to the OC 
spray industry, including studies, reports and tests regarding the adverse effects of exposure to 
OC. (Conf. Ex. 4, pp. 000004-000007, ~~ 8-17.) Through this information, SEC stays up to date 
on trends, changes, concerns and issues in the industry, including any concerns voiced by law 
enforcement officers regarding use ofOC spray. (Jd.) 
c. Prior to March 2008, SEC did not have any actual knowledge or 
information associating exposure to OC spray with long-term chronic adverse health effects such 
as those of which Major complains. (Conf. Ex. 4, p. 000007, ~ 17.) SEC never saw or heard of 
any peer-reviewed or scientific publications that suggested that exposure to OC spray has a 
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chronic or long-term health effect such as that of which Major complains. (Id.) 
d. There is no published literature that definitively states or. otherwise 
establishes within a reasonable degree of scientific probability a conclusive or causal association 
between exposure to OC spray and chronic or long-term conditions or disease. (Conf. Ex. 3, p. 
000001, ~~ 3-7, 10-12; Conf. Ex. 4, p. 000001, ~~ 8-17; Conf. Ex. 1, p. 000118, 94:11-95:3; 
Conf. Ex. 1, p. 000142,128:9-131:4.) 
e. The literature and studies show that, while some individuals with a certain 
history of medical problems, including asthma, lung infection and gastro esophageal reflux, may 
experience greater acute responses from exposure to OC spray, those responses have been found 
to be transient, reversible and recoverable in a short period. (Conf. Ex. 3, p. 000001, ~ 12.) 
f. Based upon available scientific and medical literature published prior to 
2008, a manufacturer of OC spray products, such as SEC, could not know or have been put on 
notice that exposure to OC spray could be a cause of chronic medical conditions complained of 
by Major. (Conf. Ex. 3, p. 000001 ~ 10; Conf. Ex. 1, p. 000118, 144:2-146:7.) 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to SEC on the issue of 
whether SEC owed a legal duty to warn of unknown risks of chronic injury posed by exposure to 
its pepper spray products? 
B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit as a 
sham affidavit, and in denying Major's third motion for reconsideration of its prior ruling 
striking the Second Affidavit of Dr. Yost? 
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C. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to SEC on the issue of 
whether SEC owed a legal duty to warn of the known risks of acute injury posed by exposure to 
its pepper spray products? 
D. Did the trial court err in denying Major's second motion for reconsideration on 
the issue of damages derived from acute injury? 
E. Did the trial court err in denying Major's Third Motion for Reconsideration of its 
prior summary judgment rulings on whether SEC owed legal duties to warn of risks of acute and 
chronic injury posed by exposure to its pepper spray products? 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
F. Is SEC entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, on the basis that Major's appeal has been brought 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation? J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of 
Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 319,193 P.3d 858, 866 (2008). 
G. Is SEC entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, on the basis that Major has made no substantial 
showing that the district court misapplied well-settled law? Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 
Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999). 
V. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
With respect to the decisions of the trial court on SEC's motions for summary judgment, 
"this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the 
motion." Fragnella v. Petrovich, et aI., 2012 WL 2344867, at *3 (Idaho June 21, 2012) (citing 
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Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004». Summary judgment 
is appropriate. "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). "If, however, the 
basis for a properly supported motion is that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard 
to an element of the non-moving party's case, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to 
establish an issue of fact regarding that element." Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 
171, 175, 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996) (citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 
Idaho 270, 272-73,869 P.2d 1365, 1367-68 (1994». "The non-moving party must submit more 
than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." 
Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439, 444 (2004). "Moreover, a mere scintilla 
of evidence or merely casting a slight doubt of the facts," however, "will not defeat summary 
judgment." Fragnella, 2012 WL 2344867, at *3. "In other words, to create a genuine issue, 
there must be evidence upon which a jury may rely." Id. (citing Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 
112 Idaho 85, 730 P.2d 1005 (1986». Furthermore, "the trial court is not required to search the 
record looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing 
the summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the court's attention." Vreeken v. 
Lockwood Eng'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 104,218 P.3d 1150, 1164-65 (2009). If the nonmoving 
party does not meet its burden, and "the evidence reveals no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, then all that remains is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175,923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996). 
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In order to accurately assess whether a genuine issue of material fact existed under the 
facts presented to the trial court on summary judgment, this appellate Court must preliminarily 
determine whether the trial court's evidentiary rulings were proper: "The admissibility of 
evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed before applying the liberal construction 
and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of 
material fact .... " Fragnella, 2012 WL 2344867, at *4. The Court must apply "an abuse of 
discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment." !d. (quoting Gem State 
Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.3d 172 (2007» (emphasis added). The abuse of 
discretion standard holds: "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives 
the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal 
standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." !d. (quoting O'Connor v. 
Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846,851 (2008». 
Finally, when reviewing a decision on a motion for reconsideration, this Court is to apply 
the same standard as on the underlying issue for which the moving party sought reconsideration: 
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the 
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order 
that is being reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter 
within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the 
motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a different 
standard, then that standard applies to the motion for reconsideration. Likewise, 
when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for 
reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the lower 
court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. 
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Id.at*10. 
As applied to the issues in this appeal, the foregoing law dictates that this Court first 
apply the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's decisions to strike certain affidavit 
testimony of Major's expert, Dr. Garold Yost. Then, the Court must tum to whether the record 
contained information sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to prohibit entry of 
summary judgment. Finally, the Court must determine whether the various motions for 
reconsideration of the orders striking the Yost testimony and granting summary judgment were 
appropriately denied according to the standards set forth herein. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Properly Granted And Upheld Summary Judgment In Favor Of 
SEC On Major's Claims Of Liability For Alleged Chronic Injuries. 
1. Applicable Law and Legal Standards. 
The legal standard for a manufacturer's duty to warn in a product's liability case was 
described by this Court in Puckett v. Oak/abco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816,979 P.2d 1174 (1998): 
Failure to warn can be a basis for recovery in a products liability action, whether 
alleged under a theory of strict liability in tort or negligence. See Watson v. 
Navistar Int'l Trans., Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 660, 827 P.2d 656, 673 (1992) A 
product is defective if "the defendant' has reason to anticipate that danger may 
result from a particular use' of his product and fails to give adequate warnings of 
such danger." 
132 Idaho at 823 (quoting Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974), and 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt. h) (emphasis added). The limitation outlined in 
Puckett, that a manufacturer has a duty to warn of a danger only if it has "reason to anticipate" 
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that danger, is repeated throughout Idaho case law: "The duty to warn has been held generally to 
apply only to a supplier who knows or has reason to know the unsafe condition of the product 
when used for the purpose for which it was supplied." Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equipment 
Company, Inc., 94 Idaho 819, 826, 498 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1972). Hornbook law agrees: 
One who supplies ... a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those 
whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel ... for physical harm caused 
by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it 
is supplied, if the supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be 
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied 
will realize its dangerous condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous 
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (emphasis added). "[T]he supplier is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to disclose its condition, in so far as it is known to him, to those who are 
to use it, or to inform them that it is fit only for these limited uses, or if used with the particular 
precautions." Id, cmt. H (emphasis added). 
While a manufacturer of a product is "held to the knowledge and experience of experts in 
their field," Idaho law does not require that manufacturers and product sellers be "clairvoyant." 
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, a Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 112 Idaho 328, 338, 732 P.2d 297, 
307 (1987). Rather, imputed "[k]nowledge of the product's risks" must be "based on reliable 
and obtainable information . ... " Id. (emphasis added). 
A manufacturer cannot be held liable for the failure to warn of a risk of a product if the 
specific danger or harm alleged by the plaintiff is unknown or unforeseeable. See Sidwell v. 
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William Prym, Inc., 112 Idaho 76, 730 P.2d 996 (1986). In Sidwell, this Court determined that 
even though "the manufacturer (of sewing pins) could anticipate the danger of a pin pricking, 
puncturing, or piercing dressmaking or other materials or the bodily surface of a user," no 
reasonable juror could find that the manufacturer could "foresee the danger that the pins would 
be thrust into the body with sufficient force to strike a bone and shatter." !d. at 78-79. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the pin manufacturers had no duty as a matter of law to warn of 
this unforeseeable risk, relying in part on the fact that "[ e ]ven plaintiff's own expert witness 
admitted that while billions of such pins have been sold, that he had no knowledge of any other 
[similar] accident or complaint of injury caused by such pins." Id. at 79. 
The notes of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 22 on required 
warnings articulate the rationale behind not mandating warnings for risks that are merely 
speculative or far-fetched: "Such warnings would tend to debase warnings and detract the user's 
attention from warnings about risks of greater significance." Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, § 2, Reporters' Note to cmt. i. As such, "[a]n overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions supports the proposition that a manufacturer has a duty to warn only of risks that 
were known or should have been known to a reasonable person." Id., Reporters' Note to cmt. m 
(citing Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Anderson v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 
1168 (Colo. 1993) ("A manufacturer cannot warn of dangers that were not known to it or 
2 SEC recognizes that Idaho has not yet adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts. However, those cases 
cited and discussed in the notes of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in this section were all issued prior to 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts and demonstrate uniformity in products liability decisions across the 
country on this issue. 
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knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing scientific and technical knowledge 
available at the time of manufacture and distribution." (Emphasis added.» 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit recently applied these well-settled principals to claims of 
injury from another defensive weapon commonly utilized by law enforcement personnel. See 
Rosa v. Taser International, Inc., 2012 WL 2775006 (9th Cir. July 10,2012). The plaintiffs in 
Rosa asserted causes of action against a well-known manufacturer of electrical control devices 
(stun guns) for, inter alia, failure to warn of abnormal adverse health reactions that the plaintiffs 
argued should have been "gleaned from isolated reports of potential side effects." Id. at *2. In 
granting summary judgment to the manufacturer, the trial court had determined "the scientific 
research cited by the [plaintiffs] did not address T ASER' s products, was not publicly available, 
or represented nothing more than hypothesis, unproven by scientific methodology." Id. The trial 
court concluded that the plaintiffs therefore "had not established a triable issue of fact that 
T ASER should have known of the risk," that there was therefore no duty to warn of the risk of 
the injuries alleged, and on that basis granted summary judgment to the manufacturer. Id. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision granting summary judgment to the stun 
gun manufacturer on the same grounds. !d. at *3-5. Interpreting California law consistently with 
the above-quoted Restatement sections, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a manufacturer has a 
"duty ... to warn of a 'particular risk' if it is 'known or knowable in light of the generally 
recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of 
manufacture and distribution. '" Id. at *3 (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted). 
Though the California courts had not previously defined a clear standard to determine 
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whether a particular risk was "knowable," the Ninth Circuit in Rosa examined "a few key 
considerations" which are instructive. Id. First, as in Idaho, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a 
"manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of an expert in the field." However, it added 
that a manufacturer "cannot defeat liability because it did not review the relevant scientific 
literature." Id. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, "a manufacturer is not under a 
duty to warn of 'every report of a possible risk, no matter how speculative, conjectural, or 
tentative,' because 'inundat[ing the public] indiscriminately with notice of any and every hint of 
danger' would 'inevitably dilute[e] the force of any specific warning given.'" Id. (quoted as in 
original, internal citations omitted). "[S]uch reports of isolated or speculative injuries do not 
constitute generally accepted medical knowledge." Id. (emphasis added). In short, the Ninth 
Circuit confirmed in Rosa that, in order to give rise to a duty to warn, a risk must be generally 
known, prevailing and accepted in the scientific community. A duty to warn cannot be based on 
isolated reports of possible risk or untested or unpublished theories of an individual scientist. 
2. Major Presented No Evidence Sufficient to Create a Genuine Issue of 
Material Fact Regarding the Foreseeability of her alleged Chronic Injuries. 
The primary focus of Major's claims is that SEC failed to warn that exposure to OC spray 
could cause the actual injury from which she has allegedly suffered a long term, chronic, 
irreversible illness characterized by excessive chronic coughing. To support her claims, Major 
filed three separate affidavits of the same expert, Dr. Garold Yost. 
I. The First Yost Affidavit 
The First Yost Affidavit was deficient in creating the genuine issue of material fact 
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necessary to avoid entry of summary judgment because Dr. Yost focused more on causation of 
injury, rather than foreseeability of risk, and on an acute injury which Major did not have, 
instead of the chronic injury that is the basis for her claim for damages. Moreover, Dr. Yost also 
failed to provide an adequate foundation to support his conclusory opinion about what SEC 
should have known about risks of injury he associated with exposure to OC spray. For all of 
these reasons, the trial court correctly held that Dr. Yost's first affidavit did not create a dispute 
of material fact as to whether SEC knew or should have known that exposure to its OC spray 
could cause chronic, irreversible injury of the type alleged by Major, and therefore that Major 
had failed to establish that SEC had a duty, as a matter of law, to warn of those risks. 
One of the most significant problems with the First Yost Affidavit is that it fails to 
provide the requisite factual foundation to support Dr. Yost's conclusory statements asserted. 
"The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material 
fact exists to withstand summary judgment-he must set forth, by affidavit or deposition, "specific 
facts" showing a genuine issue. Butters v. Valdez, 149 Idaho 764, 770,241 P.3d 7, 13 (Ct. App. 
2010) (citing LR.C.P. 56(e); Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695,697-98 
(2007)). As the trial court correctly noted, "this affidavit does not clearly tee up the issue of --
does not create a material dispute of fact because ... he doesn't come back and say that it's 
undisputed or that there are these studies or something that says there is this risk of chronic 
disease as a result to the exposure." (Tr (7/14111) 85:15-22.) Dr. Yost did not attach or cite from 
any of the publications that he claimed supported his opinions about the "risks" of exposure to 
OC spray. (R 000412-413.) Where the "affidavit does not set forth any specific facts or data 
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used to support" the OpInIOn, the affidavit becomes "nothing more than an unsupported 
conclusion" and need not be given any evidentiary weight on summary judgment. Fragnella, 
2012 WL 2344867, at *7 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, even if the trial court were to overlook the fact that Dr. Yost did not support 
his affidavit statements with any documented evidence, the First Yost Affidavit still failed in 
substance to create a genuine issue of material fact about the foreseeability of chronic effects of 
exposure to OC spray because its focus was on acute, not chronic, injury. As correctly noted by 
the trial court, Dr. Yost "does not really address the real issue here, which was whether they 
would have known in 2008 when this -- this product was marketed that there was this danger, a 
foreseeable risk of developing a chronic illness such as the plaintiff developed." (Tr (7/14111) 
83 :4-10.) Regarding this key issue, the First Yost Affidavit only discusses the foreseeability of 
risk in two paragraphs paragraphs 6 and 7 (the rest are dedicated to opinions about whether the 
exposure actually caused Major's alleged injuries - recognized as a distinct issue by the trial 
court (Tr (7/14111) 81:16-82:3). (R 000412-414.) 
In paragraph 6 of his first affidavit, Dr. Yost opines: 
Based on my review of the above cited articles and my education, traInIng, 
research and knowledge of the scientific literature in the relevant area, it is my 
opinion that the risks to the respiratory tract posed by exposure to SEC's SABRE 
Red law enforcement 10% OC Spray (MK-9 Fogger) were known and foreseeable 
risks at the time SEC sold its product to IDOC. 
(R 000413 (emphasis added).) What Dr. Yost fails to do in paragraph 6, and why his first 
affidavit fails to create a genuine issue of material, is draw any distinction between acute risks to 
the respiratory tract, and chronic risks to the respiratory tract: 
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[H]e's the one who doesn't distinguish between chronic and acute .... 
[I]f I take that paragraph as true, it doesn't support his conclusion. And 
that's what's really important, is does he have anything to support his conclusion 
which is completely conc1usory .... 
. . . And I don't see anything in any of his affidavits that really definitively 
point to whether he -- whether studies existed -- at the time that this product was 
used whether studies existed that would have identified chronic -- this chronic 
condition as a result of exposure. 
(Tr (7114111) 42: 13-14,42: 18-44:5; see also Tr (7114111) 83:4-20.) 
In paragraph 7 of his affidavit, Dr. Yost further confused the issue by opining that prior to 
2008, "it was known ... that people with asthma and chronic cough" would have "greater 
sensitivity to capsaicin" and, as such, would be expected to have "higher acute respiratory 
responses to a multitude of respiratory irritants." (R 000413-414 (emphasis added).) The trial 
court rightly found that his opinion about acute injury failed to create a genuine issue of material 
fact about the foreseeability of a risk of chronic respiratory illness: 
That affidavit really doesn't -- it says result in higher acute respiratory 
responses. And the issue here is chronic .... 
Now, I assume he's being very specific as a scientist because he doesn't 
want to say something that he can't support. In a prior paragraph, again, he 
doesn't say chronic -- development of chronic disease. He never says that. 
In the [next] paragraph he does not say chronic. He says acute. That's 
what he says. 
In other words, what I'm trying to say is this affidavit does not clearly tee 
up the issue of -- does not create a material dispute of fact because there is not a 
direct dispute between Dr. Reilly other than for him to say I don't agree with him. 
But he doesn't come back and say that it's undisputed or that there are these 
studies or something that says there is this risk of chronic disease as a result to the 
exposure. 
(Tr (7/14111) 42:13-16,84:19-85:1,85:14-22.) 
Importantly, in her own briefing opposing the initial motion for summary judgment filed 
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by SEC, Major admitted that there was no known study that she could point to that makes the 
requisite causal connection between OC spray and the chronic illness that she has alleged in this 
action: "[SEC] may be right that no one has conducted a study of the SABRE Red MK-9 
'Fogger, or like product, to determine whether long-term chronic illness or aggravation of illness 
may be a risk of exposure to such products." (R 000408.) Major's counsel reconfirmed that 
admission during the hearing on SEC's first motion for summary judgment: "The -- ok. There's 
no study where they've taken subjects, exposed them to O.C. spray and found that it caused the 
symptoms and condition that my client has." (Tr (7114111) 36:21-24.) 
The trial court's analysis of the First Yost Affidavit is accurate, and Major has not 
presented this Court with any reason why the trial court should have reached a different result. 
The First Yost Affidavit did not specifically address the issue of foreseeability of chronic injury, 
and did not produce any evidence from peer-reviewed literature to suggest that a manufacturer of 
OC spray in 2008 should or could have known that its product carried a risk of causing chronic 
respiratory illness. By relying on Dr. Yost, Major has sought to alter the law by imposing a duty 
on manufacturers to warn against risks that are not generally recognized or prevailing, but rather 
which exist only as unpublished theories in the mind of an individual scientist. (R 000578, 
139:5-24.) Not only is this standard not supported by law, it is also a practical absurdity, as 
recently recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Rosa. 2012 WL 2775006. This Court should 
therefore affirm the ruling of the trial court, granting SEC's first motion for summary judgment. 
ii. The Second Yost Affidavit 
In his second affidavit, Dr. Yost attempted to explain and expand upon the opinions set 
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forth in his first affidavit to state that SEC should have known that exposure to its OC spray 
could cause the chronic injuries from which Major allegedly suffers, but in doing so he directly 
contradicted his prior deposition testimony on the same subject, and once again failed to provide 
adequate foundation to support his opinions. Since Dr. Yost failed to explain the contradictions 
between his affidavit testimony and his prior deposition testimony, the trial court correctly struck 
the second affidavit as a sham affidavit, and correctly reaffirmed that Major had failed to proffer 
any evidence that SEC knew or should have known that exposure to its OC spray could cause the 
chronic, irreversible injury from which she complained, and therefore held that, as a matter of 
law, SEC did not owe a duty to warn of a risk of chronic respiratory injury. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that an affidavit submitted in support of or in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall " ... set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence . 
. . " I.R.c.P. 56(e); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44, 844 P.2d 24,26 (1992), citing Petricevich 
v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969) ("[A] court will consider only 
that material contained in affidavits or depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and 
which would be admissible at trial"). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 
admissibility of the evidence in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is 
a threshold question to be answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable 
inference standard to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
fact for trial. Fragnella, 2012 WL 2344867, at *4; Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining 
Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P. 2d 1192 (1992); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42,844 P.2d 24 (1992); 
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990). If the admissibility of evidence 
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on a motion for summary judgment is raised by one of the parties, the Court must address that 
issue first. Id. Following this principal, the trial court in this matter correctly took up SEC's 
Motion to Strike the Second Yost Affidavit before hearing Major's first Motion to Reconsider 
the entry of summary judgment. (Tr (9/15/11) 96:11-97:9.) 
A court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Morris ex. rei Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 141,937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997). 
This Court recently reiterated that it "applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection with a motion 
for summary judgment." Fragnella, 2012 WL 2344867, at *4. "A trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of 
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an 
exercise of reason." Id. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right 
of the party is affected." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574 903 P.2d 
730, 739 (1994). 
The problem presented by affidavit testimony that contradicts earlier deposition 
testimony has been addressed by Idaho federal and state courts, and is generally known as the 
"sham affidavit rule." Essentially, the sham affidavit rule precludes a party from creating an 
issue of fact to prevent summary judgment by simply submitting an affidavit that directly 
contradicts prior deposition testimony by the affiant. Without such a rule, the utility of summary 
judgment as a procedure for screening out meritless claims would be lost. 
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Courts have consistently held that parties cannot prevent summary judgment by filing 
"sham" affidavits that directly contradict deposition testimony. See, e.g., Boise Tower 
Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint Master Trust, 2007 WL 1035158, 12-13 (D. Idaho 
2007) (quoting Clevelandv. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999)) ("[Courts] have 
held with virtual unanimity that a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive 
summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement (by, say, 
filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's earlier sworn deposition) without 
explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity."); Van Asdale v. Int'! Game 
Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 
262, 266 (9th Cir.1991)) ("[I]f a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise 
an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this 
would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham 
issues of fact."); see also Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Ct. 
App. 1994) ("[A] sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be disregarded 
on a summary judgment motion .... "); Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. JR. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 
607,862 P.2d 299 (1993) ("[W]e agree that the purpose of summary judgment is served by a rule 
that prevents a party from creating sham issues by offering contradictory testimony ... ,,).3 
3 SEC recognizes that after the final judgment was entered in this case, this Court made the affirmative 
statement that Idaho has not yet recognized the sham affidavit doctrine. Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 2012 
WL 1557284, *4 (Idaho May 4, 2012). In Arregui, as the affidavit in question had been untimely filed, 
and could be disregarded on that basis, the Court did not need to recognize the sham affidavit doctrine at 
that time. Based on the law set forth in this section, SEC contends that it is appropriate and consistent 
with prior decisions of the appellate and federal courts of Idaho, and the "virtual unanimity" of other 
jurisdictions, to now formally recognize the sham affidavit doctrine in Idaho. 
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Since Major sought to create a genuine issue of material fact on the foreseeability of 
chronic respiratory effects from exposure to OC spray, by relying exclusively on expert affidavit 
testimony that directly contradicted the same witness's sworn deposition testimony, without any 
explanation for the contradiction, the trial court properly acted within its discretion in striking the 
Second Yost Affidavit as a sham affidavit. (Tr (9115111) 135:1-140:11,147:14-153:13.) 
Contrary to Major's argument, Dr. Yost's Second Affidavit clearly contradicts his prior 
deposition testimony on the absence of scientific knowledge associating OC spray exposure and 
chronic, irreversible injury. In paragraph 9 of the second affidavit, Dr. Yost stated: 
First, I believe it best to state unequivocally that it is my expert opinion, based on 
my education, research, and training, that the scientific literature and studies in 
existence prior to 2008 was such that when viewed as a body of literature and 
human and animal studies, it was known that a product such as SEC's MK-9 
Fogger posed a risk of both acute and chronic respiratory injury such as that 
described in Ms. Major's medical records. 
(R 001068, , 9.) Later, he summarized his conclusion, saying "it was known prior to 2008 that a 
product like SEC's MK-9 Fogger posed a risk of causing acute and chronic injury to the 
respiratory system." (R 001070, , 12.) 
In direct conflict with this affidavit testimony, Dr. Yost previously testified ill his 
deposition given on April 19,2011: 
Q. Is it your understanding that the adverse health affects that exposure to 
OC and capsaicinoids by humans are generally deemed to be 
temporary, reversible and not long-term? 
A. I think that's fair, yes. 
(R 000572, at 63:4-63:8 (emphasis added).) 
Later in the same deposition, Dr. Yost confirmed that no studies have been done on the 
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potential for OC spray to cause chronic adverse health effects: 
Q. All right. Do you recall having in your review of the scientific and 
medical literature seeing any peer-reviewed publications that specifically address 
the association between OC exposure on the one hand and long-term chronic 
adverse health effects on the other? 
A. Well, that's what I was referring to before, that I don't think the studies 
have been done or published that definitively -- well, that provide robust data 
about that scenario, that OC exposure -- now, I'm talking about OC exposure in a 
chronic sense, multiple cases of exposure. 
Q. Oh, multiple exposures? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's fine. 
A. And, no, I don't think that -- I haven't seen studies that make that --
that come to that conclusion that there are adverse effects, because I don't 
think people have done the studies. 
(R 000573, at 100:22-101:15 (emphasis added).) Consistently, Dr. Yost also testified in his 
deposition that the only known effects of exposure to OC spray are transitory: 
Q. Have you, in your review of peer-reviewed publications, seen any 
articles that focus on the duration of time after exposure to OC that adverse health 
effects are customarily deemed persistent in humans? 
A. I would say my general opinion is that -- general conclusion from 
literature is that they are transitory and that would generally mean, you know, 
more than a minute and probably less than a day or two. So I think there's 
substantial evidence that the pain, irritation, lacrimation, et cetera, that we 
talked about before is not long -- it doesn't persist for weeks and months. 
(Id at 101:21-102:8 (emphasis added).) 
Finally, Dr. Yost unequivocally stated in his deposition that there was no literature prior 
to March 2008 that would have put someone on notice that exposure to OC spray could cause 
long-term adverse health conditions: 
Q. In your opinion, as of March of 2008, was there anything definitively 
published in the peer-reviewed scientific and medical literature that would have 
put a manufacturer of pepper spray products such as SEC on notice that exposure 
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to their products by somebody with the chronic health conditions of Ms. Major 
would have cause her an exacerbated response which would have included an 
ongoing chronic cough tor the subsequent period of time? 
A. ... I don't think that existed then. In the literature today, I don't think it 
exists except through the preponderance of the evidence, and it may very well be 
that other people don't believe that's the case, but I do .... 
Q. Well, do you think people that were trained in toxicology such as yourself 
would have been able to review the medical literature and the scientific literature 
that existed on or prior to March of 2008 and have been able to determine that 
there would have been a life-altering condition that resulted from pepper spray 
exposure? 
A. I don't see evidence that the normal ways for industrial hygiene officers or 
personnel to evaluate such kinds of exposures mayor may not have existed at that 
time. I haven't seen it. ... I'm not aware of anything that the normal 
layperson in the industry would say or would see that would necessarily show 
that. 
Q. But you can't cite me to one specific paper out there that existed prior to 
March of 2008 that specifically would have put laypersons without your 
background on notice that exposure to their product could have caused these long-
term health conditions? 
A. No. 
(R 000580-581, at 153:16-25, 154:6-10, 154:12-22, 155:3-5, 155:20-156:1 (emphasis added).) 
In his Second Affidavit, Dr. Yost completely reversed his testimony, without explanation 
as required by the sham affidavit doctrine.4 (See, e.g., R 001068, 1 9, supra.) On that basis, the 
trial court correctly perceived the changed testimony as an attempt to create a fact dispute for 
purposes of defeating summary judgment, and justifiably struck those portions of the Second 
Yost Affidavit that contradicted Dr. Yost's sworn deposition testimony on this most critical 
issue. (Tr (9115111) 101:14-104:17,112:20-114:10,118:16-120:7, 135:1-136:21, 147:10-154:9.) 
4 Major's counsel admitted during the hearing on the Motion to Strike Dr. Yost's Second Affidavit that 
Dr. Yost did not explain the contradictions between his affidavit testimony and his deposition testimony. 
(Tr (9115111) 128:9-129:8, 135:1-136:25.) In fact, Major's counsel asked the trial court for permission to 
file a new Dr. Yost affidavit in order to explain those contradictions, which the trial court denied. (Jd., 
152:21-153:13.) 
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The trial court made a very thorough analysis of the information provided in the Second 
Yost Affidavit. (See, e.g., Jd.) When examined under this Court's three-prong analysis for 
determining whether the trial court acted within its discretion, Fragnella, 2012 WL 2344867, at 
*4, the decision to strike the contradicting portions of the Second Yost Affidavit ought to be 
upheld. First, the trial court recognized that the admissibility of the contradicting expert opinion 
was a threshold matter that had to be dealt with in the court's discretion prior to the merits of 
Major's first motion for reconsideration, seeking to overturn the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of SEC. (Tr (9115/11) 96:11-97:9.) 
Second, in striking the conflicting portions of the Second Yost Affidavit, the trial court 
"act[ed] within the bounds of its discretion and applied the correct legal standard." Fragnella, 
2012 WL 2344867, at *4. SEC had briefed at length the law of the sham affidavit doctrine, both 
in its motion to strike Yost's first affidavit and again in its motion to strike the Second Yost 
Affidavit. (R 000591, 001335.) The trial court recognized that the sham affidavit doctrine was 
strongly supported by both the federal and state courts, and was careful to apply the doctrine 
only to those statements that were truly in conflict with Dr. Yost's deposition testimony. (Tr 
(9115111) 103:7-104:17, 126:18-127:21.) 
Finally, again adhering to the standards for discretionary decisions, the trial court 
"reach[ ed] its decision" to strike the conflicting portions of the Second Yost Affidavit through an 
undeniable "exercise of reason" and thorough analysis. Fragnella, 2012 WL 2344867, at *4. 
The transcript from the trial court's hearing on September 15, 2011 evidences that analysis, 
where the trial court identified and discussed the conflicting affidavit and deposition testimony 
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on the foreseeability of chronic injury. (Ir (9115111) 132:24-134:23, 138:3-24, 147:14-154:11.) 
Ihe trial court also recognized that Dr. Yost had failed to comply with the requirements 
of the sham affidavit doctrine by not explaining why his opinions had changed: 
He doesn't explain anything about the conflict between his deposition 
testimony and his affidavit. Instead he spends all of his time adding to his old 
affidavit and he's still using imprecise language where it seems to me he's talking 
about causation more than he's talking about anything else .... 
Now what we're doing is we're going through iterations of the affidavit 
where he's trying to get closer to what he thinks I'm getting at in order to 
overcome the summary judgment. And that's my concern. He still doesn't 
explain how his -- how his affidavit, especially this most recent one, which is in 
conflict, why -- he hasn't explained why there's the difference and that's the 
concern. 
And with due respect, the last motion to strike was very clear as to what 
the law is and including all of the information about the fact that it's not a sham if, 
in fact, the person says I didn't remember at the time or I -- at least I've rethought 
or there's new there's new studies that I've looked at or something to explain 
why there's the inconsistency. And there -- in my view it's clearly inconsistent --
... in a very material way. 
(Ir (9115111) 135:4-10, 136:2-21.) 
Even if, for the sake of argument, the trial court erred in striking the contradicting 
statements of Dr. Yost, the Second Yost Affidavit would have failed to create a genuine issue of 
material fact on the existence of a duty to warn of chronic injury, as his conclusions lacked any 
supporting foundation. As correctly analyzed by the trial court, the articles that he had attached 
to his affidavit, purportedly to support his changed testimony, did not indicate that chronic 
respiratory illness would result from exposure to OC spray. (Ir (9115111) 101:14-104:17.) 
Although the trial court ultimately struck the affidavit as a sham, it nevertheless read each of the 
articles appended to the Second Yost Affidavit and determined, rightly so, that they did not 
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actually support the conclusion that chronic disease was a foreseeable risk in March, 2008. (Id.) 
And my concern after looking at these studies is that he has a -- I don't 
have any problem with an expert having a conclusion where he gives the 
foundation for the conclusion and says based on the following, that's where I 
made these determinations. But my concern here is when he has this list, those 
things, like I said, they seem -- because I went through all of the stuff that he gave 
us, all of the literature, and he picked out the ones where the word "chronic" 
appears. 
And I -- it bothered me because when you go back and looked at it, the 
word "chronic" was not -- was not related to the creation of a chronic condition 
by the exposure to capsaicin. It was a completely different use of the word. And 
so I I don't know where he's getting that. ... 
. . . He's not saying that the exposure to capsaicin is the cause of this. 
(Tr (9/15/11) 113:10-114:1, 115:25-116:2.) 
In his second affidavit, Dr. Yost attempted to create a genuine issue of material fact by 
making conclusory statements that were neither supported factually by the evidence he claimed, 
nor consistent with his prior deposition testimony. Once the conf1icting testimony of Dr. Yost 
was rejected, the state of the evidence was not materially different from that reviewed by the trial 
court in granting SEC's first motion for summary judgment. (Tr (9/15/11) 153:3-154:9.) With 
the underlying support for Major's motion for reconsideration having been stricken, the trial 
court correctly denied that motion and reaffirmed its prior summary judgment ruling. 
iii. The Third Yost Affidavit 
In his third affidavit, Dr. Yost attempts to correct the defects of his first two affidavits, 
but instead of adequately explaining why his affidavit testimony directly contradicted his prior 
deposition testimony, Dr. Yost tried to convince the trial court that there was no contradiction 
between the affidavit testimony and the prior deposition testimony. Moreover, although he cited 
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from a few articles in an attempt to support his assertion that SEC should have known of a risk of 
chronic, irreversible disease, neither the articles relied upon by Dr. Yost, nor his citations from a 
few of them, actually supported his conclusion. The trial court correctly held that Dr. Yost's 
conclusions were nothing more than unpublished theories of a single scientist, Dr. Yost, rather 
than published opinions generally recognized and prevailing in the scientific community, and 
therefore that Dr. Yost's third affidavit was also insufficient to create a material dispute of fact 
on whether SEC knew or should have known of the risk that exposure to its OC spray could 
cause the type of long term, chronic, irreversible illness of which Major complains. 
Preliminarily, despite having been through two previous motions to strike on the basis of 
the sham affidavit doctrine, Dr. Yost in his third affidavit still failed to provide any explanation 
as to why his testimony had changed between the time of his deposition, when he had declared 
that no one in 2008 could foresee a risk of chronic respiratory injury as a result of exposure to 
OC spray, and the time of his last two affidavits, when he entirely changed his testimony on that 
subject. (Tr (1126/12) 24:12-19, 27:24-28:22.) Rather, Dr. Yost simply disagreed with the court 
as to whether there was any conflict between his deposition testimony and his affidavit 
testimony, basing his disagreement on semantic loopholes and unsupported conclusory 
statements. (R 001772-1778.) On that basis, SEC filed yet another motion to strike the Third 
Yost Affidavit on the same grounds as before the testimony constituted a sham affidavit, and it 
further lacked any foundation in the evidence provided with the affidavit. (R 002182-2186.) 
The trial court again correctly recognized the defects in the Third Yost Affidavit: "At no 
point did Dr. Yost explain why there is a -- a difference between his deposition testimony and the 
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testimony he's giving now." (Tr (1/26/12) 24:12-14.) The trial court properly rejected Dr. 
Yost's blanket assertions that his testimony was in conflict: "[i]ts's not up to him to determine 
whether his affidavit conflicts with his deposition. It does. And no number of times of him 
saying that it doesn't change [sic] that fact. It clearly conflicts." (Id. at 24: 15-19.) Nevertheless, 
the trial court denied SEC's motion to strike the third affidavit on the grounds that it was a sham 
affidavit, indicating: "I think the Supreme Court should read the affidavit. The affidavit really 
doesn't change anything . . . .,,5 (Id. at 24: 9-11.) The trial court was correct: the Third Yost 
Affidavit did not alter the state of the evidence in any meaningful way. 
The Third Yost Affidavit failed to present any new or groundbreaking evidence that 
would tend to expose any error in the trial court's orders, or otherwise justify a reversal of the 
trial court's entry of judgment against Major. Since a party resisting summary judgment bears 
the burden of identifying specifically what evidence in the record creates genuine issues of 
material fact, neither the trial court nor this Court is required to dig through the voluminous 
articles Gointly labeled as "Exhibit A" to the Third Yost Affidavit (R 001784-2033» to ascertain 
whether any such evidence exists. Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 104, 218 
P.3d 1150, 1165 (2009). Rather, Major at all times bore the burden to identify the evidence most 
helpful to her case. !d. 
5 SEC initially filed a Notice of Cross Appeal, directed at the trial court's decision to not strike the Third 
Yost Affidavit, as the trial court had recognized that Dr. Yost again failed to comply with the 
requirements of the sham affidavit doctrine. However, because Dr. Yost failed to provide the requisite 
foundation for his opinions, and because the evidence submitted was insufficient to create a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether SEC should have been on notice in 2008 that its OC spray carried a risk of 
chronic respiratory illness, SEC concluded that the trial court's decision to not strike the last affidavit 
was, at worst, harmless error. SEC therefore voluntarily dismissed the Cross Appeal. 
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With the Third Yost Affidavit, Major produced a number of articles that she and Dr. Yost 
asserted support the claim that her alleged chronic injuries should have been foreseeable to SEC 
in March, 2008. (R 001763.) Notably, in her memorandum in support of the motion for 
reconsideration, Plaintiff did not point to any specific evidence out of any of the articles. (R 
001762-1764.) Neither she nor Dr. Yost even provided the trial court the courtesy of identifying 
the titles, authors, or number of articles that make up the 2S1-page compendium titled "Exhibit 
A." (Jd.) The only discussion regarding the content of any of the additional articles presented 
was contained within the Third Yost Affidavit, which itself only addressed two of the many 
articles attached thereto.6 (R 001779-1780.) 
To the extent that Dr. Yost discussed the content of the newly-furnished articles, which 
discussion presumably contained the best that Dr. Yost could find in all of the articles presented, 
that discussion still failed to bring to light any evidence warranting a reversal of the trial court's 
previous orders granting summary judgment. Principally, the articles presented with the Third 
Yost Affidavit had the same deficiencies that invited the trial court's criticisms of the earlier 
articles presented: they did not provide any support for the conclusion that exposure to OC spray 
6 Dr. Yost also cited from three articles with which he had collaborated with Dr. Chris Reilly, which 
discussed certain effects of capsaicinoids and other respiratory irritants. (R 001780-1781.) However, Dr. 
Yost failed to indicate where, if at all, the effects identified therein were indicative of risks of chronic 
respiratory disease. (Jd.) Though he identified discussion of "cell death" in the articles, he did not explain 
that such cell death, which is common in the human body under all circumstances, was known to cause 
chronic respiratory illness. Coupled with the fact that Dr. Chris Reilly was SEC's main toxicology 
expert, who had previously testified on summary judgment that there was no literature or scientific studies 
available prior to March, 2008 that would have put a manufacturer of OC spray on notice of the risk of 
chronic respiratory effects (Conf. Ex. 3, pp. 000004-5, ~7), Dr. Yost's testimony about the Reilly articles 
did not present a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. 
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would produce long-term and/or chronic adverse respiratory effects.7 (See R 001784-2033.) 
In .paragraph 11 of his new affidavit, Dr. Yost cited a 1997 article authored by Michael D. 
Cohen, entitled "The Human Health Effects of Pepperspray - A Review of the Literature and 
Commentary." (R 001779.) However, the Cohen article suffers from the same defect as Dr. 
Yost's initial affidavit - it failed to distinguish between acute respiratory effects and chronic 
respiratory effects. (See R 001792-1808; Tr (1126112) 15:8-20.) Moreover, the article confirmed 
what SEC has asserted throughout this entire litigation - that there is no known, long-term 
adverse respiratory health risk associated with exposure to OC Spray: "[T]here are insufficient 
data currently available to fully define the health risks of pepperspray .... " (R 001779, ~ 11.) 
Cf Rosa, 2012 WL 2775006, at *4 (noting that one of the studies the court rejected as evidence 
of foreseeability of risk merely concluded that the cause of in-custody death was "still poorly 
understood," and any link between in-custody death and use of stun guns was only a hypothesis). 
Next, in paragraph 12, Dr. Yost cites to David A. Groneberg's 2004 article, "Models of 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease." (R 001780,001809-1857.) Significantly, this article 
does not even mention OC spray, oleoresin capsicum, capsaicin, capsaicinoids, or pepper spray. 
(R 001809-1857.) Its sole focus is on Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). (!d.) 
Not only did the article not address the issue at hand, such as would provide evidence of 
knowledge in the prevailing scientific literature of risks of chronic respiratory illness, but Dr. 
Yost made no effort to explain the relevance of the article to his own hypothesis. As the trial 
7 Even as Dr. Yost directed limited attention to the content of the articles produced, his citations were 
unreliable. By way of example, Dr. Yost quoted one article as saying, "For some, symptoms persisted for 
weeks or more" (R 001779, ~ II), while the article actually says, "For some, symptoms persisted for a 
week or more." (R 001794.) In this case, that difference is significant. 
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court correctly noted, Dr. Yost "didn't in his affidavit even explain what in these articles came to 
that conclusion." (Tr (1126112) 16: 17-19.) 
Notably, the analysis of the articles produced by Dr. Yost and reviewed by the trial court 
is closely analogous to the trial court analysis upheld by the Ninth Circuit in Rosa. In that case, 
in an attempt to prove foreseeability of injury, the plaintiffs relied "primarily on four 
peerreviewed articles." 2012 WL 2775006, at *3. Upholding the trial court's analysis, the Ninth 
Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs' articles and, as did the trial court in this case, "conclude[d] that 
these articles do not present a triable issue of fact that the risk was more than purely speculative." 
Id.; see also Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 2012 WL 2330226 (5 th Cir. June 20, 2012) ("The 
reliability prong mandates that expert opinion [under Daubert] 'be grounded in the methods and 
procedures of science and . . . be more than unsupported speculation or subjective belief. '" 
(Citation omitted.)). The defects with the Rosa articles are analogous to the defects in the 
articles presented by Dr. Yost. Just as the Groneberg article referenced by Dr. Yost does not 
mention OC, an article rejected by the Rosa court made "no attempt to link either its findings or 
[the injury] to the use of electronic control devices." Id. at *4. Along those same lines, the Rosa 
court rejected a case study where "none of the cases involved electronic control devices." Id. As 
previously noted, just as the Cohen article relied on by Dr. Yost expressly found "there are 
insufficient data currently available to fully define the health risks of pepperspray," a study 
rejected by the Rosa court admitted the causes of in-custody deaths "are still poorly understood." 
!d. Though Dr. Yost was unable to uncover any articles that supported his hypothesis, it is 
significant that the Rosa court rejected an article that merely set forth an untested hypothesis for 
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which there was "no adequate information" linking the injury and the product: "This sort of 
hypothetical side effect is insufficient to require a warning .... " Id. SEC urges this Court to 
follow the reasoning of the trial court in this case and the Ninth Circuit in Rosa, as nothing 
provided by Major has established "a triable issue of fact that the risk of' chronic respiratory 
illness "was knowable at the time of distribution." Id. at *5. See also Johnson, 2012 WL 
2330226, at *4 (concluding that where "the scientific literature is devoid of any data or peer-
reviewed articles indicating that exposure to MBTC or HCI will result in chronic lung disease, 
and such a proposition is not generally accepted in the scientific community," an expert's 
unsupported opinions may be disregarded). 
At best, the articles cited and furnished by Dr. Yost can be viewed to provide additional 
support for his personal hypothesis on the medical causation of Major's alleged chronic 
condition, but they fail to present any facts to suggest that anyone in 2008 shared Dr. Yost's 
present-day hypothesis that exposure to OC spray carried a risk of chronic respiratory injury. 
Even on his third attempt, Dr. Yost was still unable to provide any literature or other evidence 
establishing that, prior to March, 2008, a risk of long-term and/or chronic adverse respiratory 
health effects from exposure to OC Spray was known to anyone in the world. 8 
8 It should be noted that Dr. Yost attached a new Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) within Exhibit A to 
his third affidavit, without explaining how the MSDS indicates a risk of chronic respiratory illness. (R 
00 1772, ~ 5; 001785-1791.) This new MSDS relied upon by Dr. Yost is for a product entirely different in 
chemical makeup than SEC's OC spray. Dr. Yost's new MSDS sheet is for pure Capsaicin, which is 
only one of three chemicals that together comprise a mere 1.33% of the OC Spray formula manufactured 
by SEC. (Compare R 001785 with Conf. Ex. 2, p. 000523.) Accordingly, Dr. Yost's reference to a 
different chemical solution's MSDS was irrelevant. Cj Johnson, 2012 WL 2330226, *6 (rejecting as 
unsupported and lacking requisite foundation an expert's conclusion that because one irritant may cause 
chronic respiratory disorders, it is foreseeable that all irritants would as well). 
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Dr. Yost's third affidavit falls woefully short of meeting the required legal standard set 
for in Rosa, that it was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing 
best scientific and medical knowledge available in March, 2008 that chronic, irreversible injury 
was a risk of exposure to OC spray. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
order denying Major's third motion to reconsider its prior summary judgment rulings. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted And Upheld Summary Judgment In Favor Of 
SEC On Major's Claims Of Liability For Alleged Acute Injuries. 
After the trial court granted SEC's first two Motions for Summary Judgment, holding that 
SEC had no duty to warn of the risk of the chronic injuries of which Major complained, in an 
effort to salvage some remaining thread of her case, Major asserted for the first time that SEC 
failed to adequately warn of the acute risks of exposure to its OC spray, and that if SEC was 
found liable for failing to warn of acute injuries, it could also be liable for damages for chronic 
injuries. These new theories, which focused on hypothetical acute injuries which Major did not 
have, were the subject of SEC's Third Motion for Summary Judgment and Major's Second 
Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court quickly saw through Major's ruse, and correctly 
rejected her attempt to "back door" potential liability for acute injury into potential liability and 
damages for chronic injury. (Tr (10117111) 181:11-184:17.) 
Similarly, because the intended purpose of pepper spray is to cause acute, temporary and 
reversible adverse effects to the eyes, skin and respiratory systems, and because those effects of 
exposure were so widely known in the literature and the industry, and to Major herself, the trial 
court correctly held that the risks of acute injuries from exposure to pepper spray were so open 
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and obvious that reasonable minds could not differ in concluding that SEC had no duty to warn 
of them. (Jd. at 197:9-198:15.) 
1. Applicable Law and Legal Standards . 
. "This Court has held that I.e. § 6-1405 incorporated the doctrine of open and obvious 
danager 'as a component part of the comparative negligence theory. '" Puckett v. Oalifabco, Inc., 
132 Idaho 816, 824, 979 P.2d 1174, 1182 (1999) (citing Watson v. Navistar Int'l Trans., Corp., 
121 Idaho 643, 660,827 P.2d 656,673 (1992)). "Section 6-1405(1)(b) sets out an objective test 
to determine whether a danger is obvious." Id. "When the product seller proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the claimant, while using the product, was injured by a 
defective condition that would have been obvious to an ordinary reasonably prudent person, the 
claimant's damages shall be subject to reduction." I.C. § 6-1405(1)(b). 
"[W]hile a plaintiff's conduct affecting his comparative responsibility is generally a 
question for the jury, 'where the undisputed facts lead to only one reasonable conclusion the 
court may rule as a matter of law. '" Puckett, 132 Idaho at 824 (citing Corbridge v. Clark Equip. 
Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986); see also Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 
Idaho 145, 149,868 P.2d 473,477 (1994).) "The question becomes 'whether the danger involved 
is so obvious that it is umeasonable to impose on the manufacturer a duty to warn.'" Id. (citing 
Watson v. Navistar Int'l Trans., Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 660, 827 P.2d 656, 673 (1992).) 
"Rephrased, [when] the risks involved here [are] so undisputedly obvious, failure to warn of 
those risks [does] not render the product defective." Id. Though the "question of whether a 
danger is open and obvious is generally one for the jury," "[0 ]nce the manufacturer proves by a 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 42 14542-0 II (474303) 
preponderance of the evidence that an alleged . . . danger is obvious," and indeed "clearly 
obvious to any reasonable person," no duty to warn of that risk may be found as a matter of law. 
Id. "Where the undisputed facts lead only to the objective conclusion that a particular risk is 
glaringly obvious, imposing a duty to warn of such a risk serves no function and would be 
unreasonable." Id. 
In a case with facts strikingly similar to those in the instant case, this Court has 
previously determined that the obviousness of an acute injury will as a matter of law bar a 
plaintiff from seeking damages claimed to arise from that acute injury. See Sidwell v. William 
Prym, Inc., supra. Though the product in question in Sidwell, a sewing pin, was inherently 
dangerous in one respect, that danger did not open the door for plaintiff to obtain a windfall 
judgment in her favor for a known and foreseeable acute injury: 
In the instant case it is clear that the manufacturer could anticipate the danger of a 
pin pricking, puncturing, or piercing dressmaking or other materials or the bodily 
surface of a user. However, it is equally clear that such danger is as obvious to 
the user as it is to the manufacturer. Hence, there was no requirement that the 
manufacturer give notice of such a danger, and a jury could only have found that 
such danger was obvious. 
112 Idaho at 79 (emphasis added). Where, as here, the evidence is clear that "reasonable minds 
could not differ" on whether the danger is as obvious "to the user as it is to the manufacturer," 
courts may properly hold as a matter of law that there is no duty to warn of such danger. Id. 
2. SEC's Third Motion for Summary Judgment was Properly Granted, and 
Major's Second Motion for Reconsideration was Properly Denied. 
In the proceedings below, the trial court appropriately recognized the difference between 
failure to warn in the context of an unforeseen risk and failure to warn in the context of a 
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foreseeable open and obvious risk. (Tr (10117/11) 197:20-198:19.) Whether a duty arises to 
warn of those respective categories of risk turns on different facts, and the trial court properly 
recognized that in Major's acute injury claim, the facts of record did not, as a matter of law, give 
rise to a legal duty to warn: "Like Sidwell, and it's amazing how similar they really are, there is 
also no duty to warn where the danger is obvious." (Tr (10/17111) 196: 11-13.) 
There is no dispute in this action about the known purpose of OC spray, especially as it 
relates to trained, law enforcement personnel: "Pepper spray is intended to cause acute adverse 
health affects in humans; its purpose is to demobilize subjects for a temporary period of time, 
allowing the individual using the product to safely escape or, in the case of law enforcement, 
gain control of an offender." (Conf. Ex. 2, pp. 000002-3, ~ 2.) The product is classified as a 
"non-lethal weapon," used worldwide by military, law enforcement, and private citizens. (Jd. at 
pp. 000002-04, -06, ~~ 2, 9, 14.) "All known affects [sic] of exposure to pepper spray are acute, 
temporary, reversible and recoverable." (Id. at ~ 2.) The trial court agreed: 
And this product is functioning as it was designed to function. The purpose 
behind pepper spray is to do exactly what the plaintiff is complaining about in the 
sense that it's causing an acute reaction. That is its purpose. 
(Tr (10/17111) 197:9-14.) 
The product label for the SEC OC spray about which Major complains appropriately 
indicates that proper use of the weapon involves targeting the "nose and mouth," indicates that 
the "contents are dangerous," and instructs that decontamination should start with removal of an 
affected person to an "area of fresh air." (Conf. Ex. 2, p. 000501.) Prior to her exposure to 
SEC's OC spray in March, 20008, Major had been well-trained in the use and effects of OC 
RESPONDENT'S BRlEF - 44 14542-011 (474303) 
spray by her employers, who instructed Major and her associates with OC spray materials 
furnished to them by SEC.9 During training, Major received information about the acute effects 
of OC spray on the respiratory system. (Id.) In fact, Major herself was administered written 
tests that included questions about the acute respiratory effects of OC spray, and she was able to 
answer those questions correctly. to Prior to her March 3, 2008 OC spray training, Major was had 
experienced the acute effects of OC spray exposure, first hand, at least four (4) times in annual 
OC training between 2004 and 2007. 11 The facts demonstrate that Major was warned of the risks 
ofthe acute reaction to OC spray, and that such risks were open and obvious to her. 
Based on the foregoing, the acute, temporary, reversible and recoverable effects of 
exposure to OC spray were so obvious that, as in Sidwell, no reasonable juror could determine 
that SEC had a duty to warn Major of those risks. Judgment as a matter of law in favor of SEC 
was therefore appropriate, as a legal duty to warn of obvious, acute injury did not exist. 
While Major does not dispute that she was aware of the risk of acute respiratory injury, 
she contends that SEC is liable for not providing a warning that was specific to her particular 
medical and respiratory condition at the time of exposure. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 38-41.) 
However, Major failed to come forward with evidence that the acute effects of exposure to OC 
spray were anything other than a variation on the same acute, temporary, reversible and 
recoverable effects that were well-known to Major and the industry. The trial court correctly 
recognized this when it commented that there is no extra duty to warn of a particular variation on 
9 See Statement of Facts, infra, No. 5(h)-5(i). 
10 See Statement of Facts, infra, No. 5(j)-5(m). 
11 See Statement of Facts, infra, No. 5(b)-5(d), 5(f)-5(g), 5(0). 
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the same acute reaction for a "thin-skinned plaintiff." (Tr (10117/11) 196:2-197:2.) As the Ninth 
Circuit in Rosa explained, "a manufacturer is not under a duty to warn of 'every report of a 
possible risk, no matter how speculative, conjectural, or tentative,' because 'inundat[ing the 
public] indiscriminately with notice of any and every hint of danger"' would 'inevitably dilute[e] 
the force of any specific warning given.'" Rosa, 2012 WL 2775006, at *3. Applying the same 
logic, and relating Major's argument back to Sidwell, the trial court correctly observed: "Let's 
talk about the pin. Did the manufacturer have to put a warning that if you're a hemophiliac and 
you prick your finger, it could be deadly? And obviously no. And really that's what the plaintiff 
in this case is arguing. I'm unusual. I'm different. They should have warned." (Tr (10/17/11) 
197:3-8.) Similarly, the trial court noted, "[t]he Supreme Court said there was no duty to warn 
that a pin could prick. Likewise, there was no duty to warn that it could prick and also infect." 
(Id. at 196:18-21.)12 In this case, therefore, there is no duty to warn that exposure to SEC's OC 
spray could cause or exacerbate the specific respiratory reaction that Major incurred. 13 
Major also attempts to confuse this Court by asking it to ignore Idaho law on legal duty 
to warn, and follow other, "well-established case law" that she claims supports her attempts to 
12 Major's argument is additionally defective because, as was the fatal flaw in her case for chronic injury 
damages, she presented no evidence to suggest that SEC should have known that a person with her 
particular health factors would have an acute reaction that would result in a long-term, chronic condition. 
(Tr (10/17111) 197:20-198:15.) 
13 The nature and intensity of each exposed person's acute reaction to OC spray is not predictable or 
subject to objective analysis. Each acute reaction may vary depending on the type of OC spray employed, 
the quantity and potency of the spray employed, the duration of exposure, the ventilation and size of the 
space or environment within which the spray is employed, the size and dispersement of spray droplets, the 
body parts exposed to the spray, the extent of any decontamination employed, and the individual 
sensitivity of the person exposed to the spray. Regardless of the extent of the reaction, the known and 
obvious facts are that it will be acute, temporary, reversible and recoverable. See Statement of Facts, 
infra, Nos. 6(a), 6(e). 
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recover damages for her alleged chronic injuries by piggybacking her claim that SEC had a duty 
to warn of risks of acute reactions to OC spray (a ploy that the trial court rightfully rejected as an .. 
attempt to "back door" the applicable law on the duty to warn (Tr (10117111) 182:12-183:6». 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-42.) Stated differently, Major advocates that the law permits her to do 
indirectly (capture consequential damages for her chronic injuries) that which she could not do 
directly (recover damages for chronic injuries in absence of a duty to warn of the risk of chronic 
injuries). She is asking the Court to circumvent Idaho law on foreseeability of risk and find that 
she can recover consequential damages for her chronic injuries if she proves SEC failed to warn 
of the risks of acute injuries. The case law relied on by Major to support this argument is 
irrelevant, antiquated, distinguishable and unpersuasive. 
First, three of the cases relied upon by Major are Federal Employers' Liability Act 
(FELA) cases. See generally, CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630 (2011); 
Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963); Burklund v. Oregon Short Line R. 
Co., 56 Idaho 703, 58 P.2d 773 (1936). Liability under FELA, as explained by the Supreme 
Court in McBride, intentionally deviates from the general principals of negligence and/or strict 
liability that are relevant in the instant case: "Before FELA was enacted, the 'harsh and 
technical' rules of state common law had 'made recovery difficult or even impossible' for 
injured railroad workers. '[D]issatisfied with the [railroad's] common-law duty,' Congress 
sought to 'supplan[t] that duty with [FELA's] far more drastic duty of paying damages for injury 
or death at work due in whole or in part to the employer's negligence. '" McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 
2638 (internal citations omitted, alterations in original). FELA, like most state workers 
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compensation laws, "rejected common-law formulations of proximate cause," and instead sought 
to '''fix liability' in language that was 'simple and direct.'" .Id. at 2639-2640. Where FELA 
deviates from common law principals of tort liability, then, is in rejecting "stock proximate cause 
terminology" and applying a standard whereby a railroad carrier is liable for the entirety of the 
injured worker's injuries, no matter how insignificant the carrier's negligence and no matter how 
remote the worker's injuries. Id. at 2644. This standard, as is clear from the cases cited by 
Major, is unique to FELA and is a departure from the common law principals that rule this case. 
The remaining cases cited by Major are equally distinguishable and similarly lack 
authoritative weight over the issues relevant to this case. Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 
Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (Wis. 1926), which is a Wisconsin case cited by Plaintiff that precedes 
any draft of the Restatement of Torts, involved a woman who sliced her finger on a cracked 
bottle of milk. 208 N.W. at 902. The woman thereafter became septic, and died less than one 
month later. Id. Unlike in the present case, there was no dispute in Koehler about whether the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty or whether that duty was breached. See generally, !d. 
The Koehler court found that the defendant had breached its general duty to exercise ordinary 
care when it provided a glass bottle that was broken. !d. at 904. In doing so, it recognized the 
distinction between duty on the one hand, and damages on the other: "The measure of the 
defendant's duty in determining whether a wrong has been committed is one thing; the measure 
of liability when a wrong has been committed is another." Id. at 904 (emphasis added). This 
decision is therefore premised on the assumption that a legal duty, and some liability for a breach 
of that duty, existed. In contrast, in the instant case, Major has been unable to prove a 
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fundamental element of her liability claim - a legal duty to warn - and as such, notwithstanding 
the fact that Idaho law (as enunciated in Sidwell) would prohibit the same result anyway, the 
issue of consequential damages discussed in Koehler does not apply. 
Similarly, Boal v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 98 F.2d 815 (3d. Cir. 1938), also cited by 
Major in support of her attempt to gain access to damages associated with alleged chronic injury 
by way of the known, acute reactions to OC spray, is a pre-workers compensation case 
evaluating an employer's liability for injuries to his employee under Pennsylvania law. 98 F.2d 
at 817. In Boal, an employee developed cancer following his exposure to mist of sulphuric acid 
in a battery-making process. Id. In ruling that the defendant employer could be held liable for 
the employee's cancerous injuries, the Third Circuit made a finding that substantially 
distinguishes Boal from the present case. The Boal court found that "the precautions taken by 
defendant for the safety of its employees while working in its plant did not come up to the 
standards prevailing in the industry generally." Id. at 818. Specifically, the court found: 
[T]he evidence shows that the existence and danger of this spray could have been 
known by the defendant if it had exercised due and proper diligence which the 
law required of a reasonable prudent person. There existed on this subject general 
scientific knowledge which the defendant could have ascertained from various 
publications and persons acquainted with the art if proper inquiry had been 
made. 
!d. (emphasis added). In other words, before addressing the issue of damages, the court in Boal 
found that the defendant had breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff. In contrast, in this case, 
despite multiple affidavits from Major's expert, Dr. Yost, Major has failed to produce any 
evidence that would suggest that SEC "could have ascertained" the risk of long-term, chronic 
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injuries claimed by Major. (Tr (1/26/12) 25:1-27:18.) Therefore, no legal duty to warn of the 
risk of chronic injuries has been established, and absent a legal duty, and evidence of its breach, 
the issue of consequential damages for Major's chronic injuries does not even arise. 
Since no duty to warn of the alleged chronic effects of exposure to OC spray exists in this 
case, the authorities cited by Major to support the argument that she should be entitled to recover 
damages for chronic injuries on proof of breach of a duty to warn of acute injuries are not 
applicable, and the trial court's rulings on SEC's third motion for summary judgment and 
Major's second motion for reconsideration should be affirmed. 
VII. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
SEC is entitled to an award of attorney fees on this appeal, based on well-established case 
law interpreting Idaho Code § 12-121. "Idaho Code § 12-121 permits an award of reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal if the action was brought or pursued frivolously, 
umeasonably or without foundation." J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 
Idaho 311, 318, 193 P.3d 858, 865 (2008). This Court has previously set forth two relevant 
circumstances in which an award of attorney fees is appropriate under Section 12-121: 
First, "[w]here issues of discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if the 
appellant fails to make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion." Id. In this case, 
a significant portion of Major's appeal is dedicated to her criticism that the trial court should not 
have struck the Second Yost Affidavit as a sham affidavit. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-38.) There 
is no dispute that the decision to admit or deny expert testimony was within the discretion of the 
trial court. Fragnella, supra, at *4. Nonetheless, Major does not address the applicable 
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discretionary standards at any point in her argument. Rather, the argument advanced by Major in 
support of this issue on appeal does nothing more than what Major attempted to do below: 
"playing games with what [Dr. Yost was] saying." (Tr (9115/11) 134:16-23.) Major spends her 
entire argument accusing SEC and the trial court of misreading the plain statements contained' in 
Dr. Yost's deposition testimony, asserting that it is not in conflict with the second affidavit; she 
does not meaningfully address the fact that the trial court, properly and within its discretion, gave 
significant attention to the affidavit and deposition testimony of Dr. Yost and determined, as a 
matter of law, that the statements were fundamentally in conflict and that Dr. Yost never 
provided a cogent explanation for that conflict. (See generally, Tr (9115111) 118:16-154:15.) On 
this basis, for having to respond to an appeal that lacks cogent arguments, SEC is entitled to an 
award of attorney fees on appeal. 
Similarly, this Court has determined that "[a]n award of attorney fees is appropriate 'if 
the law is well-settled and the appellants have made 'no substantial showing that the district 
court misapplied the law.'" Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377,973 P.2d 142, 148 
(1999) (internal citations omitted). In all respects, the foreseeability element of a failure to warn 
claim is well-settled and uniform throughout nearly every jurisdiction and the Restatements 
relative to products liability law. Like the conduct that prompted an award of fees in Bowles, 
Major's arguments "are largely incomprehensible, unreasonable, and lacking foundation in law." 
!d. Major's primary expert admitted to the lack of foreseeability of risk of chronic injury from 
exposure to OC spray: "I don't think it existed then." (R 000581,154:6-7.) He also admitted 
that even his own, present-day opinions on the causal connection between OC exposure and 
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chronic cough were nothing more than a "hypothesis," "less credible" than the known, acute 
effects of exposure to OC. (R 000578-579, 139:14, 142:6-7.) Major has therefore made "no 
showing that the district court misapplied the law" requiring that a duty to warn be premised 
upon a risk that is generally known or knowable according to the generally recognized and 
prevailing scientific knowledge. Bowles, 132 Idaho at 377. Moreover, in an attempt to gain 
access to damages from her alleged chronic injury by way of her acute injuries, Major has relied 
on legal citations that are both irrelevant and in direct contradiction to well-established (and 
current) law in Idaho. (See Section VI.B.2 of this Brief.) Without again restating the 
deficiencies in the case law presented by Major, suffice it to say that her arguments lacked 
"foundation in law" and attorney fees are therefore appropriate. Bowles, 132 Idaho at 377. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated herein, Major has failed to prove at any stage of the summary 
judgment proceedings that SEC had a duty to warn of the risks of injuries that she has 
complained of in this action. Major's own expert, Dr. Yost, has admitted that there was nothing 
scientifically known, beyond his own untested hypothesis, that would justify a warning about the 
chronic effects of exposure to OC spray. There is no evidence in the record of a history of 
claims of chronic injuries suffered by other persons exposed to OC spray. If Dr. Yost's 
hypothesis on the cause of Major's injuries is correct, Major may be the only person in the world 
who has suffered a chronic injury from exposure to pepper spray. The record is also devoid of 
any evidence from the generally recognized and prevailing scientific literature suggesting that 
exposure to OC spray may cause chronic, irreversible injury. At best, Major has presented the 
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unpublished, conclusory testimony of one scientist, Dr. Yost, who may be the only scientist in 
the world who has concluded that there is an association between OC exposure and chronic 
disease. Such isolated, unsupported testimony is not legally sufficient to impose a legal duty on 
SEC to warn of this potentially unforeseeable risk of chronic injury. 
It is ironic and curious that Major has asserted a claim that SEC failed to adequately warn 
of the risks of acute injury from exposure to OC spray when Major does not suffer from an acute 
injury, and when the designed and intended purpose of this defensive weapon is to cause acute, 
temporary adverse respiratory reactions. There is no dispute that it was well known in the 
published literature and throughout the law enforcement industry that the effects of exposure to 
pepper spray are acute, temporary, reversible and recoverable. There is no dispute that Major 
knew of these acute adverse effects, having been trained in them, and having experienced them 
first hand on numerous occasions. The trial court was correct in holding that the acute effects 
SEC's OC spray were known, open and obvious, and that reasonable minds could not differ in 
concluding that SEC had no duty to warn of them. For these reasons, SEC respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court and grant SEC its reasonable attorneys' fees in defending this 
appeal. ~l 
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